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ARTICLES
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
THE FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS IN
THE EUROPEAN UNION*
David Keeling"
I. INTRODUCTION
There are two areas in which a conflict may arise between
European Union law and intellectual property rights. On the
one hand, there are the competition rules of the EC Treaty, in
particular Article 85 which prohibits agreements in restraint of
trade, and Article 86 of the Treaty which prohibits the abuse of
a dominant position. On the other hand, there are the rules on
the free movement of goods, which are set forth in Articles 30
through 36 of the Treaty. This morning Ben Smulders dealt
with some aspects of illegal agreements under Article 85, and
touched on abuse of a dominant position under Article 86, and
Rosa Greaves will be dealing later on with the latter subject..I
therefore propose to confine my remarks exclusively to the free
movement of goods and the relationship-conflict if you
like-between the free movement of goods and intellectual
property rights.
II. THE FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS UNDER ARTICLE 30
Article 30 of the EC Treaty prohibits prohibitions and
quotas on imports of goods from other member states. To use
the language of Article 30, it prohibits "quantitative restric-
tions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect" in
* The following is the transcribed speech of Mr. David Keeling which was
given on April 15, 1994, at Brooklyn Law School. Mr. Keeling attended the April
symposium in the place of Judge Christopher Bellamy, who spoke at the fall sym-
posium in London and who was unable to attend in April.
** Barrister of GRAY'S INN, Law Clerk at the European Court of Justice.
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trade between member states. The idea is very simple: once
goods are on the market in any member state anywhere in the
European Union, they may, in principle, be exported to other
member states and placed on the market there.
It is not difficult to see how conflicts can arise between the
basic principle of free movement of goods and intellectual prop-
erty rights. Intellectual property rights are exclusive rights
and they are limited, normally, to the territory of a single
member state. I will give you a few examples of the conflicts
that can arise as a result of the exclusivity and territoriality of
these rights.
Suppose that I own a patent in the United Kingdom and
for some reason, I have not taken out a patent in
France-possibly I was not able to because my invention is not
sufficiently novel under French substantive patent law. Sup-
pose further that somebody else manufactures goods using the
patented process in France, and he or a third party exports
them to the United Kingdom. I might attempt to rely on my
British patent and bring infringement proceedings to keep
those goods off the British market. If I succeed, I have erected
an obstacle to trade between member states. On the other
hand, if I fail, the substance of my patent right will have been
destroyed, and I will be unable to do anything about infringing
goods coming from other member states. Thus we have a con-
flict between the patent right and the free movement of goods.
For another example, suppose that I manufacture marga-
rine in the United Kingdom and I use a registered trademark
"Bongo," while somebody in France, one of my competitors, is
manufacturing margarine there under the name "Dongo." The
two trademarks are arguably so similar as to engender confu-
sion amongst consumers. If we are each allowed to rely on our
trademark to exclude from our own territory goods manufac-
tured by the other person, then again, we are going to have a
barrier to trade between member states. On the other hand, if
we are not allowed to keep the other manufacturer's goods out
of our own territory, we are going to have a lot of confusion for
consumers and also for the manufacturers. Each will lose some
of his goodwill to the other and neither will be sure of his abili-
ty to maintain the reputation of his trademark by producing
goods of high quality.
Moving to the field of copyright, suppose, for example, that
I am no longer an inventor or a margarine manufacturer, but
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rather I am the grandson of a famous German author. I have
inherited the exclusive rights in his works which are still in
copyright in Germany where copyright lasts for the life of the
author plus seventy years. Suppose that in Britain, where the
term of protection is shorter, the works are out of copyright
and a British publisher publishes them without my permission
and then somebody else puts them on the market in Germany.
Can I rely on my German copyright to prevent the sale of
those goods? These are just three examples of the conflicts that
can arise between intellectual property rights and the free
movement of goods.
The authors of the EEC Treaty, or the EC Treaty as we
must now call it, were very prescient-they foresaw this con-
flict between intellectual property rights and the free move-
ment of goods. When they were drafting the first sentence of
Article 36 of the Treaty, therefore, they included amongst the
list of overriding requirements justifying restrictions on the
free movement of goods-along with public health, public mo-
rality, the protection of life of animals, artistic treasures, and
so forth-the protection of industrial and commercial property.
The second sentence of Article 36 goes on to say, however, that
the prohibitions or restrictions that are permitted under the
first sentence must not constitute a means of arbitrary dis-
crimination or a disguised restriction on trade between mem-
ber states.
Thus, the Treaty recognizes the existence of a conflict
between free movement and intellectual property rights, and
resolves the conflict by giving preference to intellectual proper-
ty rights. But it is a limited preference: The restrictions en-
gendered by intellectual property rights must be justified and
they must not lead to arbitrary discrimination or to a disguised
restriction on trade.
III. THE UTOPIAN SOLUTION
The task of interpreting and applying these provi-
sions-i.e., the task of maintaining the balance between the
two competing interests of free movement of goods and pro-
tection of intellectual property-has been given largely to the
European Court of Justice. The Court has given forty or fifty
judgments in this area in the course of the last thirty years. I
am going to attempt to summarize the basic principles that
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can be extracted from this body of case law. Before proceeding
with that, however, I would just like to mention what would be
the ideal, the utopian, solution to the problems created by this
conflict.
Some of the problems can be removed by harmonization of
national law. For example, in the copyright example I gave
you, where you have a problem due to a difference in the term
of protection, the problem may be removed by harmonization.
The Council of Ministers of the European Union has moved
toward this harmonization by adopting Directive 93/98/EEC of
29 October 1993' harmonizing the term of protection of copy-
right and certain related rights. The Council pursued harmoni-
zation in a somewhat surprising way. Under German law the
term of protection is, as I mentioned earlier, the life of the au-
thor plus seventy years. In most of the member states the term
of protection is the life of the author plus fifty years. The har-
monization which has been adopted in the Council Directive is
based on the German rule. The term of protection for copyright
in all the member states will now have to be the life of the
author plus seventy years.
I must say that, as an Englishman, this approach to the
difficult question of harmonization of law does not strike me as
entirely satisfactory, but that is the way it has been done.
As I say, harmonization of law can solve some of the prob-
lems in this area, but it cannot solve all of them. In fact, it
cannot solve some of the most difficult ones, because they are
due, not to discrepancies in national law, but to the territor-
iality of intellectual property rights-they are due to the fact
that we have United Kingdom patents, German patents,
French patents, that we have Italian trademarks, Spanish
trademarks, and so forth. What I call the utopian solution is to
replace all these national rights with a unitary Union right, in
other words, have a Union patent, a Union trademark, and a
Union concept of copyright.
There have been two initiatives in this area: the Commu-
nity Patent Convention and the Community Trademark Regu-
lation.2 The Community Patent Convention, which was signed
in Luxembourg as long ago as 1975, does envisage the creation
1. Council Directive 93/98, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9.
2. Council Regulation 40/94, 1994 O.J. (L 11) 1.
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of a single patent valid throughout the territory of all the
member states of the European Union. That convention has
not yet come into force, however, apparently because the mem-
ber states cannot quite agree on how much of their linguistic
sovereignty they are willing to sacrifice.
The other initiative in this area, the Community Trade-
mark Regulation adopted last December, envisages setting up
a Community trademark office (called, rather inappropriately,
the Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market); such an
office is, in fact, going to be established in Alicante, Spain.
Thus, it will be possible for manufacturers to register their
trademark at this single office and obtain a trademark which
is valid throughout the European Union. Of course, that would
prevent new trademark conflicts from arising in the future,
such as the Bongo/Dongo example which I mentioned earlier.
However, it would not solve the problems caused by existing
trademark conflicts.
These are merely utopian solutions, and the problems are
going to continue to exist long after these organizations have
been set up, long after these unitary rights come into being,
because national patents will continue to exist alongside the
Community patent, and national trademarks will continue to
exist alongside the Community trademark. It would be diffi-
cult, at least as regards trademarks, to envisage anything else
because there are already many existing conflicts between
identical or confusingly similar trademarks within the Europe-
an Union. As a result of the existence of ten separate trade-
mark offices in the different member states (I say ten because
the Benelux countries-Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Nether-
lands-have a single unitary system) it is inevitable that we
have many such conflicts. Three hundred thousand is the esti-
mate given by one distinguished author.' Obviously it is a big
problem and it is not going to disappear just because we estab-
lish a Community trademark office in Alicante.
3. Friedrich IL Beier, Trademark Conflicts in the Common Market: Can They
be Solved by Means of Distinguishing Additions?, 9 INTL REV. INDUS. PROP. &
COPYRIGHT L. 221 (1978).
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IV. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: BALANCING THE
COMPETING INTERESTS
What I want to do with the remaining time is to try and
summarize some of the basic principles established by the
European Court of Justice regarding the balancing exercise
that has to be carried out between intellectual property rights
and the requirements of the free movement of goods. There are
four principles that I would like to deal with, but it is going to
have to be rather superficial, I'm afraid, because of the limited
time.
A. Procedures and Conditions
The first principle is that in the absence of harmonization
of laws, it is national law-the law of each member state-that
determines the procedures and conditions governing the grant
of intellectual property rights. This principle was established
in 1982 in Keurkoop v. Nancy Kean Gifts.4 If we are talking
about minor procedural conditions, such as a rule that patent
applications have to be filed in triplicate between 9:00 A.M. and
5:00 P.M. Monday through Friday, then I have no argument
with this principle; obviously it would be unwise for the Euro-
pean Court, or for any other Union body, to start interfering
with member states' prerogatives in that area. It is question-
able, however, whether that rule should be extended beyond
the area of these minor procedural rules into the area of sub-
stantive conditions governing the creation of valid intellectual
property rights. If I quote briefly the facts of Nancy Kean Gifts,
I think I can explain why I am rather skeptical about this line
of the Court's case law.
In that case, Nancy Kean Gifts had registered a design for
a ladies' handbag in the Benelux register of designs. Nancy
Kean Gifts was not the author of the design, and it had not
acquired the design from the author; it had, as appears from
reading the report on the case, simply copied the design from
the United States register of designs. That was no obstacle to
obtaining a valid design right in Benelux which was enforce-
able against everyone except the author himself, who did not
appear to have been involved in these proceedings. Under the
4. Case 144/81, Keurkoop BV v. Nancy Kean Gifts BV, 1982 E.C.R. 2853, 2
C.M.L.R. 47 (1983).
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Benelux Uniform Design Law, you did not have to be the au-
thor of the design, and you did not have to show that you had
acquired the design from the author, you simply had to be the
first person to register the design. And if you had arrived at
the office half an hour before another person who wanted to
register the same design, you got a valid design right giving
you an exclusive right throughout Belgium, the Netherlands,
and Luxembourg to market products using that design.
What happened in this case was that another firm
(Keurkoop) wanted to import more or less identical handbags
which clearly infringed Nancy Kean Gifts' exclusive right. It
was a rather funny case, because, as far as one could make
out, both of the firms were importing the handbags directly
from Taiwan, so you may wonder what this had to do with the
free movement of goods between member states of the Europe-
an Union. Well, the fact is that Keurkoop could have been
importing the goods from another member state. They could
have been goods originating in Taiwan that were on the mar-
ket in Germany, for example, and were then imported into the
Netherlands, and there should not be any difference between,
on the one hand, goods manufactured in a member state and,
on the other, goods manufactured outside the European Union
once they have been properly imported, and customs duties
and other formalities have been carried out.
The argument raised by Keurkoop was that this registered
design was not worthy of protection under Article 36 of the
Treaty and was not really intellectual property at all, but rath-
er it was just a design that had been copied. The Court reject-
ed that argument and established this principle: in the absence
of harmonization, it is national law which determines the pro-
cedures and conditions governing the grant of intellectual
property rights. So as a result, Nancy Kean Gifts was, in ef-
fect, able to seal off the Benelux market with this exclusive
right to sell the handbag in those countries and with the right
to keep out goods from other member states. I cannot see what
the justification is, frankly, for giving somebody an exclusive
right if all he has done is just copy a design from someone else.
The European Court of Justice has so far recognized just
one exception to that principle in the recent Phil Collins5
5. Joined Cases C-92/92 and C-326/92, Phil Collins et al., 1993 E.C.R. 1-5145.
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judgment where the Court held that the rule is, in effect, sub-
ject to the overriding prohibition of discrimination on grounds
of nationality which is laid down in Article 7 of the EC Trea-
ty.6 Phil Collins, a well-known rock star, was having difficulty
opposing the sale of bootleg CDs in Germany-CDs produced
as a result of illegal recordings made at a concert given in
California. It appeared that under German law he would have
been able to prevent the bootleg sales if he had been German.
He was not able to do so because he was British, however, and
the Court held that this sort of discrimination in the granting
of intellectual property rights was contrary to the Treaty.
Unfortunately, this principle is not going to be of much use
to your American clients because Article 6 of the EC Treaty
only prohibits discrimination on grounds of nationality as re-
gards nationals of member states of the European Union.
There was, in fact, a case in Germany in which Bob Dylan
attempted to act against the sale of bootleg recordings. The
case was not referred to the European Court. Even if it had
been, I doubt whether there was much the Court could have
done for Bob Dylan because he is not, so far as I know, a na-
tional of a member state of the European Union.
B. Existence versus Exercise
The Court has consistently held that Article 36 derogates
from a fundamental principle of Union law-the principle of
free movement-and as such, it must be interpreted narrowly.
The Court has made a rather mysterious distinction between
the "existence" and the "exercise" of intellectual property rights
on this basis. The Court says that the Treaty, Article 36 in
particular, protects the existence of intellectual property rights,
but may nonetheless limit the exercise of those rights. I have
always found this distinction rather unhelpful, and in some
recent judgments the Court has not in fact bothered to refer to
it.
C. Specific Subject Matter
A slightly more helpful criterion that one can extract from
the Court's case law is the "specific subject matter" test. This
6. This has now become Article 6 of the EC Treaty as a result of the
Maastricht Treaty.
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sounds very arcane and esoteric, and when I give a talk on this
subject I notice that the eyes of people in the audience start to
glaze over and they start to look at me as though they are
wondering about my sanity. I will try to explain it: The Court
has said that because Article 36 must be construed narrowly,
since it derogates from the fundamental principle of free move-
ment, it only protects the rights that constitute the specific
subject matter of the intellectual property in question. The
Court first said this in the Deutsche Grammophon7 case in
1971, but it did not go on to say what it meant by this expres-
sion.
The meaning of this puzzling concept will, I hope, become
clearer if we look at another case, Centrafarm v. Sterling
Drug,8 decided three years later. Sterling Drug owned patents
in the Netherlands and in the United Kingdom for a pharma-
ceutical product. In the United Kingdom at that time, price
control legislation was in force, and the company was not able
to charge the sort of high price that one would expect a paten-
tee to be able to impose by taking advantage of the monopolis-
tic position conferred by his patent. In the Netherlands, on the
other hand, no price control legislation existed and the prices
were accordingly higher. A firm called Centrafarm bought
goods that had been marketed in the United Kingdom by Ster-
ling Drug and exported them to the Netherlands. An infringe-
ment action was brought against the parallel importer by Ster-
ling Drug, which tried to rely on its Netherlands patents to
keep those goods off the market. The European Court held that
the specific subject matter of a patent is the guarantee that the
patentee, in order to reward his creative effort, has the exclu-
sive right to use the invention, for manufacturing industrial
products and putting them into circulation for the first time,
whether directly or indirectly by the grant of licenses to third
parties, as well as the right to impose infringements. Now that
is quite a definition of the specific subject matter of a patent.
And it does not leave much room for further debate as to the
outcome of the case.
What does this expression "specific subject matter" mean?
7. Case 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon GmbH mbH v. Metro-SB-Grossmiirkte
GmbH & Co. KG, 1971 E.C.R. 487, 496, 10 C.M.L.R. 631 (1971).
8. Case 1674, Centrafarm BV v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 1974 E.C.R. 1147, 2
C.M.L.R. 480 (1974).
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As I say, it is a very esoteric concept, and if you are having dif-
ficulty in understanding it, all I can say is don't worry, because
a lot of other people have difficulty, and I rather suspect that
the Court of Justice itself doesn't really always understand
what it means by this expression. I think that I just about
understand it, and I think the thing that you have got to re-
member is that the Court of Justice drafts its judgments in
French. The French for "specific subject matter" is objet
sp~cifique, and I think there is a little bit of a double meaning
in the word objet in French. It can mean, on the one hand, the
core of essential rights that are granted by a patent or by a
trademark, or by some other form of intellectual property. But
it can have another meaning, a less descriptive meaning; it can
imply the objective or the purpose of granting an exclusive
right. I think that the second meaning is evident in the Court's
definition of the specific subject matter of the patent right
because the Court referred to rewarding the creative efforts of
the inventor. That was the raison d'etre, the objective, the
purpose of the patent. This second meaning of the expression
objet spdcifique is of course lost in the English translation.
Esoteric though it is, the concept of specific subject matter
is undoubtedly useful. Its value is best illustrated by a case in
which the Court made no reference to the concept. I return to
my favorite subject, namely ladies' handbags. In Keurkoop v.
Nancy Kean Gifts, the Court of Justice made no attempt to
define the specific subject matter of a design right. If it had
done so, it would surely have made some reference to reward-
ing the creativity of the designer, by analogy with the defini-
tion-given in Centrafarm v. Sterling Drug--of the specific
subject matter of a patent. It would then have been apparent
that there was no justification for granting an exclusive right
to a mere copyist. The concept of specific subject matter, when
it is properly applied, reminds us that there must always be
some fundamental justification, pertaining to the public inter-
est, for granting an exclusive right that is capable of restrict-
ing the free movement of goods.
D. .The Exhaustion of Rights
The concept of exhaustion of rights also sounds rather
mysterious, but fortunately I think I can explain this one with
greater facility because you have an equivalent in American
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law known as the "first sale doctrine." What does it mean?
Suppose that I own a United States patent, I sell goods using
the patented process here in New York, and somebody else
buys them and resells them in California. I would not be able
to rely on my United States patent to prevent the further mar-
keting of goods that I have marketed myself in another part of
the United States. That is what a German lawyer would call
the principle of exhaustion-I would be said to have exhausted
my patent by placing the goods on the market for the first
time.
Most countries, I think, have some sort of principle of
exhaustion. Most countries have a national principle of exhaus-
tion whereby you cannot oppose the further sale of goods that
you have yourself sold in the country in question, by relying on
an intellectual property right under the law of that country.
Some countries, on the other hand, have an international prin-
ciple of exhaustion whereby, if you market goods anywhere in
the world, you cannot rely on your trademark or patent to
prevent further dealing in the goods. The European Court of
Justice, consistent with its philosophy of regarding the territo-
ry of the member states as constituting a single market, has
opted for a principle of Union-wide exhaustion. And this is
really the Court's great achievement in this area.
The principle, which was laid down in Centrafarm v. Ster-
ling Drug, amongst other judgments, is very simple. If you
place goods on the market anywhere in the territory of a mem-
ber state, you cannot rely on your intellectual property rights
to oppose further dealings in those goods anywhere in the
European Union. That is why Centrafarm was unable to rely
on its Dutch patent to prevent the sale of the goods it had
marketed itself in the United Kingdom, notwithstanding that
it had been prevented from fully exploiting its patent rights in
the United Kingdom as a result of the price control legislation
in force there. The Court even held in a subsequent judgment
in 1981, Merck v. Stephar,9 that where a person had marketed
pharmaceutical products in Italy, where it was not at the time
possible to obtain a patent for such products, he could not rely
on his patent in another member state in order to oppose the
9. Case 187/80, Merck & Co., Inc. v. Stephar BV, 1981 E.C.R. 2063, 3
C.M.L.R. 463 (1982).
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importation of those goods. Some people have criticized that
judgment because it can have unfortunate consequences; it
could lead the owner of the patent to say, "well if these goods I
sell in Italy are going to be able to circulate freely in other
countries where I have got a patent, I am just not going to sell
my goods in Italy, I will withdraw from the market altogether."
The Court seems willing to accept that consequence rather
than the alternative, which would be the additional undesir-
able fragmentation of the common market.
V. CONCLUSION
There are many other things I could say, if time permitted;
I could tell you all about the rise and fall of the doctrine of
common origin, in relation to trademarks, in two cases known
as HAG 110 and HAG II and about its possible rebirth, as a
result of the recent opinion of Advocate General Gulmann in
the Ideal Standard case, in which judgment is pending. Unfor-
tunately I am not going to have time. I could also tell you
about the fascinating question of confusingly similar trade-
marks and entertain you with stories about such judgments as
the Sch6ller-Nucki"2 case, where a German court held that an
English product called "Lucky Whip," a sort of powder for mak-
ing an instant desert cream, could not be sold in Germany
because the trademark might be confused with the German
trademark "Sch6ller-Nucki," registered for ice cream. Now,
Lucky Whip/Sch6ller-Nucki, you might not think there is much
similarity there, but the German judge decided there was
enough similarity to justify a restriction on the free movement
of goods. The question was never referred to the European
Court. I hope that if it had been, the matter would have been
decided differently.
My hope is possibly unfounded in light of the Court's re-
cent judgment in Deutsche Renault v. Audi. 3 In that case the
German automobile manufacturer Audi, which uses the name
10. Case 192/73, Van Zuylen Freres v. HAG AG, 1974 E.C.R. 731, 2 C.M.L.R.
127 (1974).
11. Case C-10/89, SA CNL-Sucal v. HAG GF AG, 1990 E.C.R. 1-3711, 3
C.M.L.R. 571 (1990).
12. Judgment of Mar. 28, 1973, Bundespatentgerecht (BPatG) (cited by Advo-
cate General Jacobs in his opinion in HAG II, id.).
13. Case C-317/91, Deutsche Renault v. Audi, 1993 E.C.R. 1-6227.
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"Quattro" to designate the four-wheel drive version of its vehi-
cles, objected to the use by Renault-a French car-maker-of
the term "Quadra" to designate the four-wheel drive version of
a model called the "Renault Espace." The European Court
repeated the familiar formula that in the absence of harmoni-
zation it is for national law to determine the conditions govern-
ing the grant of intellectual property rights. It then held, some-
what surprisingly perhaps in view of its general approach to
Article 36 of the EC Treaty, that the Treaty does not require
the national courts to appraise the risk of confusion narrowly
when the supposedly similar trademarks are registered in
different member states. I must say that the idea of someone
going into a car showroom and buying a Renault Espace
Quadra in the mistaken belief that he is buying an Audi 100
Quattro, or even that the two cars must somehow have the
same technology because one element of their names is similar,
strikes me as implausible. Moreover, the two names coexist
peacefully in France and other countries, so it is difficult to see
why they cannot coexist in Germany.
The Deutsche Renault case is a good one to close on be-
cause it reminds us that intellectual property is above all
about striking a balance between the competing claims of the
person who invokes an exclusive right and the entitlement of
other persons to pursue their lawful business free of unjusti-
fied restraint. I cannot help feeling that in this case the Court
gave too little weight to the requirements of free trade and
thus failed to strike the right balance. Let us hope that it does
not signal the inauguration of a new trend.
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